21 Dec 2020 at 23:48
Cees de Groot seems to think so
You deploy, get an error message, and login to CloudWatch to see what actually happened - it’s all batch-driven, just like the bad old days, so progress is slow. At least we’re not having to walk to the printer on every try, but that pretty much sums up the progress of the last half century. Oh, and a “Function” will be able to handle a single request concurrently, so here’s your AWS hosting bill, we needed a lot of instances, I hope you won’t have a heart attack. Yes, we run workloads that your nephew can run on his Raspberry Pi 4, but this is the future of enterprise.
21 Dec 2020 at 04:48
In Lost In The Clouds Marcus Ranum started off by saying
Back when I worked in security, I regularly encountered things that just left me shaking my head, “why would anyone want to do this?” It made me feel increasingly distanced and out of touch with the industry/community, as the decision-making herd went thundering off over the horizon, ignoring the sign that said “cliff.”
The recently publicized SolarWinds Breach has a good discussion on transitive trust and the issues that can arise from that
The entire software ecosystem is one great network of relationships, virtually any of which can be lashed into a transitive trust attack. When you install the device driver for your graphics card, your Windows desktop system checks the signature on the driver and allows it to run in kernel space, with complete unrestricted access to system memory, the devices, and the CPU. But who wrote the driver? Possibly a consultant. Possibly the manufacturer. […] what if the programmer at the vendor who is writing the driver decides to use some XML parser code from some open source software repository. Do you think they read through the parser code and check for backdoors?
More from Marcus on the SolarWinds Breach
In fact it sounds like SolarWinds was a fairly typical software development shit-show. Developers sometimes feel that being smart is all that’s necessary to build secure, well-architected systems and networks. Too bad they’re wrong. I have heard development managers non-ironically say, “our guys are really on the ball and I know they monitor the code repository carefully” so that’s good enough – there’s no need to worry about someone putting code in some library that one of the developers just lifted from some open source software archive. Hint to would-be hackers: write a pretty graphing package and put a few extra nudge-nudge features in it and you, too, can pwn a ton of development shops.